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In this paper I will use the Bakhtinian notion of polyphony, 1 of a choral dialogue of multiple and heterogeneous voices, to elaborate a pluralistic account of cultural identity in general and of Hispanic identity in particular. I will complicate and further pluralize the Bakhtinian notion by talking about the overlapping and criss-crossing dialogues of heterogeneous voices that go into the formation of cultural identities. My pluralistic view emphasizes that cultural identity is bound up with differences and opposes those homogeneous models that try to irnpose a unique articulation of collective identity on the members of a group. Although I will not explicitly discuss the cornplex relations between cultural identity and racial and ethnic identity/ my pluralistic view underscores that racial and ethnic elements are crucial components of cultural identity and of its heterogeneous nature; and I oppose those contemporary views that talk about "post-ethnic" and "post-racial" identities, trying to purify individual and collective identities of racial and ethnic meanings. ' Cultural differences are everywhere. l11ere is no way around this omnipresent cultural heterogeneity in the 21st century. It has become clear that the globalized world of today is a pluri-verse, rather than a uni-verse, and that multiculturalism is not simply the exotic peculiarity of some post-colonial societies, but the inescapable predicament of the contemporary world community.
But even multicultural views of today's world and its communities are often not pluralistic enough because they frequently assume a homogeneous view of the participating cultural identities, as if each of them had a unique voice and could make only one unique contribution to the multicultural dialogue. It will be my contention that not only multicultural societies are polyphonic, but each cultural group (no matter how homogeneous it may appear to be) contains a plurality of voices. Cultures speak in many voices.4 They are heterogeneous through and through.
Differences and heterogen eity go all the way down to the very core of a cultural identity. So we need an account that can make sense of identity through diffe rences, not in spite of them.
Through the notion of polyphony I will try to articulate a pluralistic perspective that can shed light on how cultural identities are formed, sustained, and transformed, as well as on how they interact with one another in cross-cultu ral dialogues.
A philosophical elucidation of polyphonic dialogues within and across cultures is now needed more than ever. For cultural diffe rences have come under suspicion and the appreciation of their positive significance has become a difficult challenge. The radical pluralism I articulate and defe nd in this paper highlights the positive contributions of cultural diversity and the dangers of trying to re press it, tame it, constrain it, or make it fit in fixed molds and restricted spaces. As it will become clear in the last section when I apply my pluralistic approach to situated Hispanic identities in particular cultural contexts, the goal of my polyphonic view is to fa cilitate playful and diverse forms of identification and to open up sites for disidentifica tion,5 calling attention to alternative cultural spaces in which different (non-conforming) identities-distanced from mainstream culture--c an flourish.
In the next section I will articulate my pluralistic view by elaborating central in sights that I draw from Wittgen stein's philosophy of language and philosophy of culture. 1 will further develop my polyphonic pluralism in the third and fin al section by elu�idating the linguistic and cultural practices of Hispanics in particularly challenging contexts: Chicanos living by the Mexico-USA border, en Ia frontera; and marginalized groups living in urban ghettos in Mexico City.
Wittgenstein and the Hispanic family
In th is section I try to determine what the contemporary philosophical debate about Hispanic identity can learn from the historical, practical, and normative contextualism that info rms Wittgenstei n's later philosophy. I argue that from Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance we can derive a non-essentialist and pluralistic view of cu ltural identity as something that is historically situated, action-based, and value-laden. So the three crucial ingredients of my Wittge nsteinian familial view of cultural identity are historicity, agency, and normativity. On my view, cu ltural identity is produced and maintained by histo rical practices; secondly, it is crucially dependent on the agency of its members and also on the agency of those with whom they interact; and finally, a cu ltural identity has a normative dimension, that is, membership in the cultural group is informed by normative attitudes (attitudes that may be quite heterogeneous and often remain implicit). I develop my Wittge nsteinian fa milial view of Hispanic identity in two stages. In the first stage I offer a critical examination of Jorge Gracia's familial account. There I argue that Gracia's account is not Wittgensteinian enough and I criticize its metaphysical presuppositions from a Wittge nsteinian perspective. In the second and more positive stage of my argument I develop my own polyphonic interpretation of the notion of family resemblance and apply it to Hispanic identity. 2a. Gracia's Familial View: History without Agency and Normativity.
In Hispanic/Latina Identity Gracia (2000) argues that the collective identity of Hispanics should be understood as the identity of a historical family fo rmed by "a unique web of changing historical re lations." (p. 49) On th is familial-historical view, the unity of Hispanics is not a unity of commonality, but a unity of community, "a historical unity fo unded on re lations." (p. 50) According to Gracia, the origi n of the complex history that unites "our Hispanic family" is "the encounter" of Iberia and America in 1492. Gracia argues that the term "Hispanic" is the only appropriate name fo r our historical family because it is the only label that can bring together all those Iberians and Americans who have come to share a cultural identity as a result of historical events. Rather than discussing the validity of these specific contentious claims, I want to discuss instead the general strengths and weaknesses of Gracia's familial view.
The what gives unity to our Hispanic family is history per se and not the appropriation of that history in and through our practices.
However, Gracia's externalist view of history forces him to this implausible conclusion: "What ties [a group of people] together, and separates them from others, is history and the particular events of that history rather than the consciousness of that history." (p.
49)
But it is far from clear that having a distinctive history is a sufficient condition for collective identity. This externalist claim belies the fundamental practical dimension of cultural identity, which involves agency and is not something that simply happens to us as a result of history.ll1e explicit recognition of this practical aspect of Hispanic identity is essential for the self-empowerment of the group. In the second place, Gracia's familial-historical view shares with essentialist views the ambition of finding a metaphysical grounding for Hispanic identity that is independent of politiGll viewpoints. However, it seems implausible that history can provide such value-free grounding. Gracia insists that our philosophical justifications of claims about Hispanic identity "should not be based on politics, but on historical fact." (p. 67) But unless a strong fac. . l lvalue distinction is invoked, it is not at all clear that history and politics can be kept separate. Gracia seems to be reacting against accounts that have explicitly tied Hispanic/Latina identity to particular social and political agendas such as li!Jeration.6 Although Gracia acknowledges the crucial importance of the project of liberation in Latin America, he does not think that liberation should be considered as a constitutive element of Hispanicity, for the idea of liberation has not played the same key role everywhere in the Hispanic world and it is not clear that it will in the future.ll1is is indeed true, but it should not be a problem for a philosophical account of Hispanic identity that is developed for our here and now rather than for all times and all places. And this brings us to the unWittgenstenian aspect of Gracia's view. just as the traditional essentialist views, Gracia's familial-historical view purports to be .1 universal theory of Hispanic identity that is independent of specific contexts. By contrast, Wittgenstein encouraged us to look at specific cases for specific purposes. On Wittgenstein's view, the job of the philosopher is to arrange descriptions or "perspicuous representations" (PI §122) , that is, to provide elucidations by situating things in their historical, practical, and normative contexts. And it is of the utmost importance that these descriptions or elucidations are produced for "particular practical purposes" (PI § 132). However, the philosophical standpoint adopted and encouraged by Gracia's view is not the situated perspective of an engaged critic, but the detached perspective of an observer who looks at the history of our Hispanic family sub specie aetemitatis. ll1is lack of sensitivity to practical and normative contexts is damaging, for it undermines the critica l and transformative potenti al that a philosophical elucidati on of Hispanic identity should have.
In my opinion, Gracia's fa mi lial-historical view of Hispanic identity is an importa nt step in the right direction, but a step that cou ld have taken us much fu rther if it had acknowledged the practi ca l and normative dimensions of identity. An adequate fa milial account of identity needs to pay closer attention to the role of agency and va lues in the formation of identity. Gracia's view ca lls attention to one of the three crucial features of cultural identity-i .e. historicity, but disregards the other two-i.e. agency and normativity. However, these features ca nnot be separated without di stortion. As I wi ll argue in what fo llows, the historicity of a cultural group or fa mily is essentially practical and nonnative. One of the lessons we can learn from Wittgenstein's later phi losophy is that most of the concepts we use to descri be ourselves and the world around us are not applied according to fixed criteria of strict identity. When we use a concept such as "game" or "chair", we treat all kinds of different things as the same although they are not strictly identica l in any respect. That is, in our categori zations different th i ngs are treated as instances of the same category even though there is no feature (or set of features) that they all have in com mon: many different kinds of activities are cal led games and many different kinds of artifacts are cal led chairs; and we can always add new items to the list of things that fa ll under these concepts (we can always invent new kinds of games and produce new kinds of chairs). Wittgenstei n suggested that these concepts are like families, whose members resemble one another in many different ways: some may have simi lar hair, others a similar nose, others may share a particular way of talking, or a similar laughter, etc. Families are composed of heterogeneous elements. There is noth ing in particu lar that all their members must have: they si mply exhibit some similarities; they share certai n "fam ily resemblances", but there is no fixed set of necessary and sufficient co nditions that determine familial membership. As Wittgestein puts it, what bri ngs together and keeps together the members of those categories that functi on like fami lies is "a co mplicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing." (PI §66) Wittgestein's analogy between the strength of a concept and the strength of a thread illustrates this poi nt: "we extend our concept [ ... ] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre ru ns th rough its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres." (PI §67)
As I have argued elsewhere/ the familial identity of the members of a group is crucially dependent on overlapping similarities, but it is also doubly dependent on intersecti ng differences: diffe rences with members of other groups that are considered prominent, and differences among the members of the group that are considered negligible. In other words, the network of similarities in which familial identity consists must be accompanied by two distinct networks of overlapping and criss crossing differences: one network of diffe rences that sets apart the members of the family from the members of other families; and another network composed of those differences among the members of the fam ily themselves that lurk in the background and are disregarded fo r the sake of familial identity. It is important to note that the relationship that holds between these networks is a dynamic one: differences that today set apart one family from another may become inconsequential tomorrow; and, on the other hand, internal diffe rences that are considered negligi ble today may grow to be important differences tomorrow, even to the point of excluding individuals from membership in the family. At the same ti me, these dynamic fluctuations between the networks of differences correspond to transformations in the network of similarities that sustains fam ilial identity, for all these networks are mutually dependent and they are shaped simultaneously. A fa mily is a living unit whose members come and go; and, therefo re, a fa milial identity is always subject to change and must be left open. Moreover, even when the membership in the family remains the same, the relations among the members of the family (as well as their relations with other fami lies) change as differences become visible and fa mily ties are re laxed. It is important to note that these networks of similarities and differences that become indicative of familial identity have a history: they result from the conti nued use of certain associations, that is, from treati ng things in a particular way in our practi ces. These networks of similarities and diffe rences acquire diagnostic va lue simply because of the (criteria!) significance they have been given in our practices, because they have come to be seen as symptoms of membership in a group. But those similarities and differences-as wel l as their diagnostic value for cultural affiliation-are always open to contestati on (even if they do not face challenges and criticisms here and now); and claims about wh ich similarities and differences can be said to be constitutive of the cu ltu ral identity of a group are always defeasible (even if not yet defeated). In my view, the networks of simi larities and differences that have become symptomatic of familial identity ca ll for a genealogical account, that is, a genealogy of their formation through the shared ways of speaking and acting enforced by cu ltural practices (typically the dominant or mainstream practices within the culture).
This familial view of identity based on Wittgenstein's account of categori zation makes clear that the homogeneity and fixity of cultural identities are nothing but myths. Identity should be thought of as something heterogeneous and fluid. Given the fluid heterogeneity of familial identity, it is not surpri sing that all attempts to reduce the shared identity of Hispanics to common properties fai I. These fa ilures have led many to conclude that we should give up Hispanic identi ty and retreat to nati onal identities (Mexican identity, Cuban identity, Argentinean identity, etc.). But, as it turns out, these col lective identities pose the same problems (there is no fixed set of features shared by all Mexi cans, all Cubans, all Argenti neans, etc). The lesson to learn here is that we shou ld rej ect the essenti alist assumpti on that a shared identity must be based on common features. The unity of Hispanics cannot be established at the expense of diversity, but on the basis of it. As Gracia puts it, the unity of Hispanics is "a unity in diversity" (p. 49); that is, it is not a unity of commona lity, but a unity of community: the unity of a family.8 This is a polyphonic unity: families are intri nsically polyphonic because they contain a multiplicity of voi ces, standpoints, and perspectives. And the polyphony of a family is essenti ally dynamic: it is a living polyphony that cannot be fully controlled or tamed; in parti cu lar, it cannot be forced to conform to an exhaustive cata logue of admissible familial voices and perspectives, for what these are cannot be decided in advance, prior to the contingent histori cal development of the family.
My familial-histori ca l view ca lls attention to the contingencies TI1is is a formal commitment with no specific or fixed content.
TI1ere is no list of values that we are asked to sign on to in order to become a member of the Hispanic family. But the formal commitment that is involved in the normative identification with a group creates a bond with the members of the group. TI1is bond, which brings together the members of the group as a collectivity, is established and maintained through the commitment to a shared and coordinated agency that faces common problems and a common future-a commitment that is not affected by the fact that the members of the group will inevitably disagree about what their problems are and what their future should look like. TI1e specific contents that our familial commitments happen to take will be determined historically through the collective agency and ongoing negotiations of the members of the group .
As Gracia saw, history produces cultural communities or families. But history is not something that simply happens to us .
We make history (and remake it or reconstruct it). Of course this does not mean that we make it up.9 We don't simply invent history, but we construct it through our agency, individual and collective, conscious and unconscious . TI1e crucial point here is that to be a member of a cultural group or family is to be committed to participate in the collective agency of the group and in the endless process of negotiation in which their values and interests get articulated and discussed. These ongoing negotiations involve a double dialogue: a dialogue among the members of the group and a dialogue of the group (and its members) with other groups (and their members) . To these complex polyphonic dialogues I now turn.
Tongues Untied: Polyphonic Dialogues and the
Cultural Agency of Hispanics In Particular Contexts
The formation of a cultural identity requires an intra-cultural dialogue of an open plurality of voices (as many as possible).
Through this dialogue the members of a culture can produce a multi-vocal articulation of their multiple problems, needs, values, ideals, and illusions. But this dialogue needs to be supplemented with another one that goes beyond the members of the group. For, indeed, no group-no matter how powerful or hegemonic-can fully comprehend the problems it faces and fully determine its own future independently of other groups. So an inter-cultural dialogue between the cultural gro up in question and other groups with which its existence is entangled is also necessary.
We need to keep cultural dialogues as open as possible, without constraining and disciplining their constitutive diversity, that is, the plurality and heterogeneity of their voices. In other words, we need to keep our dialogues polyphonic. We have to be prepared to fight homogenizing tendencies that erase differences as well as normalizing tendencies that make certain articulations of identity mainstream and relegate other identity formations to the margins. We must resist the vain and dangerous attempt to tame the indomitable polyphony of intra-and inter-cultural dialogues. Coercive social and cultural forces and institutions (from school to the fa mily and the media) are responsible for the homogenization of mainstream identities and the marginalization of those identities that don't conform to social expectations and established social norms. These coercive fo rces-which can come from inside one's own group or community as well as fr om other social units-limit the self-expression of individuals and groups as they navigate through intra-cultural and inter-cultural dialogues.
They often restrict, handicap, and even preclude the emergence and development of alternative identities that can be subversive and transformative, for they weave the networks of similarities and differences that support relations of identification in new and alternative ways. A crucial part of this social and cultural process of disciplining identities and taming their polyphony is the attempt to subdue and domesticate new languages and dialects that people develop to express their experiences, ideals, values, needs, interests, etc. These new linguistic formations (new language-games) can faci litate the rearticulation or reconstructi on of established groups or fa milies and the creati on of new ones. Therefore, keeping cu ltu ra l dialogues open and guaranteei ng the flouri shing of polyphonic identities requires resisti ng the taming of one's tongue.
Of special interest in this respect are the frontier identities and border languages that trouble cultu ral dialogues by underscori ng their indomitable diversity and the complex dialectic between intra-familial and inte r-familial re lations. These are the languages and identities of those who live at the limits or borders between communities-en /a frontera-and often have multiple familial affi liations, belongi ng to diffe rent cultural groups or families simultaneously.1° Frontier identities and border languages have recently received special attention in the literature, especially in the pioneer work of Gloria Anzaldua. In Borderlands! La Frontera Anzaldua tells us that at the core of her Chicana identity is a cultural duplicity that makes her a stranger even to the members of her own family, let alone to those of other fa milies, to whom she appears as fu lly foreign and even deviant. Those who have frontier identities often display signs of cultural otherness in their faces and bodies, in their manners and comportment, and in their speech.lhese are signs that often come under attack, bei ng subject to the domesticati ng social and cultural fo rces that conspire to erase them. Our bodies and habits are disci plined; our to ngues are tamed. In this respect, Anzaldua talks about the concerted efforts "to get rid of our accents", which she describes as a violent attack on one's identity and basic rights: "Attacks on one's form of expression with the intent to censor are a violation of the Fi rst Amendment. El Anglo con cara de inocente nos arranc6/a lengua.
Wi ld tongues can't be tamed, they can only be cut out. " (p. 76) It is important to note that the efforts to tame one's to ngue do not come only from outside one's group or family. Anzaldua poignantly remarks that her Chicana tongue is not only tamed -and ultimately "cut out"-by the Anglos, but also by other Hispanics. Chicano Spanish is not recognized and respected by many other Spanish speakers: "Even our own peop le, other The domesticati on of a border language such as Chicano Spanish leaves its speakers tongue-tied, speechless, indeed as if their tongues had been cut out, for they are rendered unable to express themselves in their own ways . The social stigmatizati on and cu ltural orphanage of their forms of expression amount to the margi nalization of their very identities:11 "If a person, Chicana or Lati na, has a low esti mation of my native tongue, she has also a low esti mation of me. [ . . . ] I am my language. Unti l I can take pri de in my language, I cannot take pride in myself." (pp. 80-81) This moment of self-empowerment through one's tongue is a moment of cultural pride and cu ltural affirmation. It invo lves a demand for cultural solidarity, for the formation of a proud linguisti c com munity liberated from self-hatred, a community in which the margi nalized tongue finds a home and a fami ly and is no longer orphan. Anzaldua makes this poi nt in very Wittgensteinian terms, calling for the construction of a "We"--un 11Nosotras11-around a common tongue that corresponds to a shared form of life. She writes: "Chicano Spanish is a border tongue wh ich developed naturally. [ ... ] Un language que corresponde a un modo de vi vir. Chicano Spanish is not incorrect, it is a living language. [ . . . ] for a people who cannot entirely identify with either sta ndard (formal, Casti llian) Spanish nor sta ndard Engl ish, what recourse is left to them but to create their own language? A language which they can connect their identity to, one ca pable of communicati ng the realities and values true to themselves." (p. 77) As Anzaldua suggests, a common tongue that can express people's "realities and values" makes possible the cu ltural process of community formation around a shared fo rm of life. Through a common tongue people can arti cu late their shared experiences, problems, needs, interests, values, etc .; and thus cu ltural solidarity becomes possible. For this reason, Ch icano Spanish deserves recognition and respect from the members of the Hispanic fa mily as well from other cultu ral groups. For this reason also, we ought to acknowledge the special cultural productivity of border tongues in general, fo r they make possible the arti culation of new experiences and new fo rms of identity, facil itati ng the diversification of cultural norms and cultural expectati ons. The task of cultural self-affirmation through language is a complex and always ongoing task. It is extremely complex because it has to be constantly diversified, maki ng sure that no voices are left out.12 And it is also a never-ending task, fo r cultures and cultural identities are living th ings that are always changing.
Keeping tongues untied is a pressing task for which we are all collectively responsible, as individuals and as communities. But it is indeed not an easy task. In and th rough cu ltural dialogues we need to secure recognition and respect fo r all but especially fo r those who have been silenced and may be left without a voice, those whose experiences depart from normalized cultural expectati ons, those whose identities do not fit into the established cultural molds avai I able to them. There are cultural identities that need a new language to express themselves and the creation of a supportive community in wh ich to flouri sh, identities that without special attention and care-are doomed to isolation and silence because they wi ll remain margi nalized and tongue-tied. Keeping tongues untied, keeping cultural dialogues polyphonic, involves a process of constant interrogation and challenge, a process of radical but immanent critique of our cultural practices and the ways in which they include and exclude people th rough the sedimentation of cultural similarities and differences. We need to destabilize whatever cultural borders or frontiers are erected, whatever relations of inclusion and exclusion are established in the cultural landscape. This critical activity of interrogation and destabi lization of cu ltural boundaries is epitomized in the work of the Tijuana-based Ch icano perfo rmance artist Guillermo Gomez-Pena. He aptly describes his performance art as "dangerous broder-crossing" (2000) and as an exercise in "the semiotics of the frontier" and "the epistemology of multiplicity" (2002) . In his performances Gomez-Pena parodies the attitudes towards cultural differences that contribute to perpetuate oppression and marginalization. In his recent work (2002) he develops a performative critique of the objectivism of academic discourses that treat cultural differences as mere objects of study. He turns the tables on scientific observers, parodically mimicking their objetivizing gaze, when he acts as "un antropo/oco fronterizo" who crosses the borders in search for differences to add to the catalogue of exotic behavior. In his performative rendering of reverse anthropology, the "antropo/oco" Gomez-Pena captures specimens of gringos who are displayed in cages, as trophies of his cultural expedition, to an audience that is asked to form a We--a community-whose identity is defined in opposition to these cultural others. Gomez-Pena's parodic performances also contain a performative critique of the cultural exoticism that transforms cultural differences into products of consumption. This consumerist attitude toward differences is patent in cultural tourism. In their cultural explorations tourists make a spectacle of cultural differences ("the spectacularization of the bizarre"); and the more distant the cultural differences encountered, the bigger the thri II and the more reassured the tourists wi II feel about their own ways upon return from their trip. This cultural exoticism also trivializes otherness through the commodification of cultural differences that can be found in fashion and pop culture: "the young hipsters of the 90s have selectively borrowed elements from numerous third world 'pet cultures', to create their own designer tribalism." (2000, p. 272) This cultural consumerism results in the normalization of cultural differences and the creation of "alternative mainstreams". As Gomez-Pena puts it, the legacy of the 1990s is "that the insatiable and undifferentiated mass of the so-called 'mainstream' has finally devoured all margins, and the more dangerous, 'other', and exotic these margins, the better. In fact, stricto sensu, we can say that there are no margins left.
'Alternative' thought, fringe subcultures, and so-called radical behavior have actually become THE mainstream." (Ibid.)
Our challenge in the 21st century is to recognize and respect cu ltural differences without exoticizing them or commodifying them, without contributi ng to their marginalizati on or assimilati ng them to the mainstream. This challenge ca lls for the troubling of the relation between center and periphery, fo r the interrogation of the boundaries that separate cu ltural centers from cu ltural margi ns. Gomez-Pena's performances often involve a subversive violation of cu ltural expectations that invites the critica l questioning and problematization of cultural boundaries. But it is important to note that we don't need physical and geographical borders to engage in the transgression of cu ltural boundaries and social norms. Cu ltural boundaries and the differences and exclusions they institute exist even when there are no visible frontiers. And the critical interrogation of these boundaries should not be left only to performance artists and "professionals" of cu ltural otherness such as Gomez-Pena. All of us, in our own everyday activities and performances as cultural agents, should contribute to the critical questioning, reconstruction, and rearti culation of cultural boundaries. Creative and reconstructive "border-crossing" can take place within any given community and cu ltu ral landscape, even at what is considered the very core or center of the familial group in question and its "homeland" or native cultural space. This productive "border-crossing" can take place even if the physical and geographical borders are not within sight, fo r indeed there are more frontiers than the visible ones-there are borders, very real borders (even if they are not physical and visible) whenever there are re lations of inclusion and exclusion. An example of cultural "border-crossi ng" that takes place far from (and independently of) physical borders can be fo und in the unorthodox re ligious practices of margi nalized groups in the urban ghettos of Mexico City. These include the practices of worshiping Santa Muerte, a re ligious icon that "looks like hell: a scythe-wielding skeleton with a blood-curdling gri n" (as reported by The New York Ttmes, March 26, 2004, A4) . This vision of hell attracts those who come from places that feel like hell on earth, inner-city neighborhoods such as Te pito, a cri me-ravaged slum in the heart of Mexico City. Santa Muerte is "an angel of last resort for outlaws and outcasts" (Ibid.). Her fo llowers are people who live on the fringes of society, people who have been abandoned by thei r government and disparaged by their ch urch: prostitutes, petty thieves, smugglers, drug dealers and addicts, and criminals of all sorts, who have been excluded from mainstream culture and its practices, where their participation is deemed inadmissible because of the way they speak, the way they dress, their manners and habits, and indeed their lifesty le. They know they cannot go to La Vi rgen de Guadalupe dressed like that, speaking like that, living like that. And therefore they take their prayers and candle offerings elsewhere, to Santa Muerte. Her worshipers say that they adore Santa Muerte because she is their own creation and she is like them: she is depicted as enjoying chocolates and jewelry, cigarettes and whiskey. Santa Muerte has been created by the people in their own image. This is where Santa Muerte's strong popular appeal among Mexico's impoverished and neglected masses lies. This religious icon has been constructed and is used as a site of cultural identification that fil ls a void created by social and cultural exclusions. As Hayde Solfs Cirdenas-a street vendor who sells smuggled sneakers in Te pito-is reported to have said, La Vi rgen de Guadalupe "wou ld not sympathize with a life like hers, tending rather to well-off people with college degrees and nice clothes", but Santa Muerte "hears prayers from dark places" since "she was sent to rescue the lost, society's rejects" (Ibid.).
The Catho lic Church in Mexico has condemned Santa Muerte services as devi I worship, and law enforcement authorities keep a close eye on this cult, which they link to street violence and delinquency. But this tout court condemnation and persecution are problematic and socia lly irresponsib le, for they simply ignore that these cu ltural practices fu lfill a crucial social need for cultural affirmation and collective self-expression. And the rejection of new forms of cultural expression is especially worrisome when it is issued from privileged places of power, and when it targets the cu ltural agency and voices of people who have been left out of accepted practices and institutions. It is too bad that marginalized cu ltural practices such as those surrounding Santa Muerte are rejected off hand by the mainstream, although this is certain ly not surprising, since the authorities and institutions of mainstream cu lture have something at stake here, namely, retaining their privileged and hegemonic status by maintaining the established boundaries between acceptable and inadmissible forms of cultural expression. Of course, my claim is not that the unorthodox religious practices surrounding Santa Muerte will surely be the path to human flourishing for the oppressed and marginalized groups that parti cipate in them. They may or may not be. But my point is simply that we must allow for alternative cultural practices like these to articulate people's experiences and to give cultural expression to their interests, va lues, aspirati ons, fears, goa ls, ideals, and illusions.13
My polyphonic view contends that our cultural practices should be open to a// possible voices. Now, it is important to note that this notion of cultural openness welcomes all voices but not all forms of symbolic interactions. For, indeed, there are non-dialogical ways in which voices can interact with other voices so as to oppress them, to margi nalize them, and even to silence them or destroy them altogether. Po lyphonic dialogues can only contribute to cultural openness if, without excluding any voice (or set of voices) in particular, they do everyth ing they can to avoid symbolic impositions, marginalizations, and forms of silenci ng (such as, for example, hate speech). It is not at all clear that the best way to avert these dangers of symbolic oppression is prohibition. In this sense, in Excitable Speech (1 997)
Judith Butler has argued quite convincingly that censorship is not the best way of dealing with the symbolic disempowerment and silencing that resu It from hate speech; and there are indeed good reasons to believe that speech codes that simply prohibit the use of certain terms are not particularly effective in the fight against symbolic oppression. Cu ltural openness is not secured by legal mandates and prohibitions. Securing cultural openness must involve arrangi ng our symbolic practices (and the discursive contexts in which they take place) in such a way that any attempt to disempower or silence voices is discouraged and neutralized, making it very difficult (perhaps even impossible) for such attempts to succeed. But it would be naive to th ink that we can create discursive practices and spaces that eliminate all possible fo rms of exclusion and si lencing. It would also be wrong to assume that the task is simply to identify those voices that are exclusionary and antidemocratic (the silencing voices of racists, sexists, homophobes, etc), because voices are plastic and dynamic:14 insofar as they are alive, they can change and are therefore moving targets that don't admit reification (they can be cooperative and inclusive here and now, and yet antagonistic and exclusionary there and then). We need to allow for alternative cultural spaces and alternative cu ltural practices. We have to make it possible fo r people to deve lop their own ways of expressing themselves and of arti cu lating their experiences, problems, interests, etc. We have the individual and co llective responsibility to do everything we can to keep cultural dialogues open and to allow for the identities of groups and individuals to be polyphonic, that is, to contain a (diverse and heterogeneous) plurality of voices. We have to keep tongues untied. We have to make our cultu ral dialogues po lyphonic. Of course, open and polyphonic dialogues do not guarantee cultural so lidarity, social justice, the mitigation of oppression, and the flourishing of happier cultura l groups or fa milies. The achievement of these goa ls is never guaranteed. But what untying tongues and having polyphonic dialogues can do is to increase the capacity that groups and individuals have to negoti ate their pasts, presents, and futures, freely, so that the conti ngent ach ievement of cultura l solidarity, social justi ce, liberati on, and happiness can come to depend (at least to some degree) on their own agency.
When tongues are untied, we do not know what they wi II say, or even in what language they wi II speak; but we know at least th is: that they wi ll be able to talk. "I wi ll have my voice [ . .. ]. 2 I have done th is in my (2004) . For a fu ller discussion of th is issue as it emerges in the discussion of Hispanic/Lati na identity, see Alcoff (2000) . ties, with intersecting fa mily ties that are often in tension. As Gomez Peiia (2 000) puts it, "we are all members of multiple co mmunities, at diffe rent times and for different reasons. Most co mmunities in the 90s are fragmented, ephemeral, dysfu nctional, and insufficient. They can only contain and 'include' selected aspects of ou rselves." (p. 277)
1
This silencing is certainly gencler-specific. As Anzaldua notes, in the case of Ch icanas, the silencing of their eth nic voices co nverges with the silencing of th eir fe male voices. In th is sense she describes how she was raised, as a woman, in a "tradition of silence": "Ser habladora was to be a gossip and a liar, to ta lk too much. [ ... ] Hocicona, repelona, chismosa [ ... ] are all signs of being mal criada. In my culture they are all words that are derogatory if applied to women-J've never heard them appl ied to men." (p. 76) This double oppression and marginalization as woman and Ch icana that Anzaldua describes rem inds us that there are mu ltiple and convergi ng fronts of oppression. The phenomenon of mu ltiple op pression has been discussed and theorize<! by Lugones (2 003). It is also 12 As Anzaklua points out, "there is no one Ch ica no language just as there is no one Chicano experience." (p. 80) Even for a single individual, ta king pride in one's tongue is typica lly not a single, unified task, but a plurality of tasks, with mu ltiple fronts, for we speak in many tongues:
"because we are a complex, heterogeneous people, we speak many languages." (p. 77) 13 In this respect some trends within liberation theology have done very importa nt work in ga ining recogn ition and respect for the unorthodox religious practices of oppressed classes and marginalized groups. See especially Althaus-Reid (2000).
14 For a fu ll discussion of the plasticity of voices and their agency, see chapters 3 and 4 of my new book (2006) . Chapter 5 elaborates the claims I have made in th is paragraph through a critical examination of symbolic processes of silencing and excl usion.
